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a naval squadron led by U.S. Commodore 
Matthew Perry forced the bakufu to sign 
a treaty that ended national isolation by 
allowing a consul-general to reside in Japan, 
and Townsend Harris came to take up this 
post in 1856. He demanded and got a 
shogunal audience at which he extorted 
a full-blown trade pact from bakufu leader 
Ii Naosuke-just as China was suffering 
defeat in the second. Opium War in 1858. 
Ii signed the treaty, in a decision that counter-
manded the orders of the emperor in Kyoto, 
not the emperor in Beijing. This defiant act 
stirred up violent nationalistic opposition, 
first among samurai from Mito domain, who 
murdered Ii in 1860, and later throughout 
the nation as well. In 1863, two other Nativist 
hotbeds, the Choshii and Satsuma domains, 
executed the expulsion edict that bakufu lead-
ers had earlier rescinded, only to suffer a 
sound trouncing at the hands of m.odern 
Western armed forces. Random acts of vio-
lence against Westerners by individual 
samurai also met a similar fate. These abject 
failures persuaded younger samurai leaders 
to admit the impossibility of "honoring the 
emperor" and "expelling the barbarians," so 
they took the step of disestablishing their 
own class privileges and ending Tokugawa 
bakufu rule so as to restore the imperial court 
to power. 
To sum up, by discrediting the Chinese 
world order and tribute system abroad, and 
by calling into question the bases of warrior 
supremacy at home, Nativism provided 
grounds for ethnic nationalism and imperial 
sovereignty to emerge in Japan by the mid-
19th century. The key ideas in Nativism 
were as follows: 
1. The Japanese are.superior to all other 
peoples for having spontaneously 
revered a divine imperial dynasty 
throughout history. 
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. 
2. Japan's emperor, not China's, invested 
Tokugawa shoguns with ruling author-
ity but did so on condition that they 
uphold national isolation, which per-
force meant preserving sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
3. That point required shOguns to expel 
unauthorized foreigners who forced 
their way into Japan and the ruling 
warrior class to live up to its Bushido 
ideology. 
4. Failure on those counts would justify 
ending bakufu rule and the warrior 
class in the name of imperialloyalism, 
and creating a new polity and a com-
moner conscript army better suited to 
carrying out the preceding tasks. 
Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi 
See also: Ii Naosuke; Kokutai and Ultra-
nationalism; Mito School; Perry, Matthew; 
Sakoku; Tokugawa Bakufu Political System; 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 
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Navy, Modernized (1868-1894) 
Much like the modern Japanese army, the 
Japanese navy in 1868 was hodgepodge of 
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men, equipment, and facilities. Although it 
was initially subordinate to the army, the 
government gradually centralized the navy, 
updated its fleet, expanded shipbuilding 
facilities initiated by the Tokugawa shOgun-
ate, sent foreign students abroad for training, 
and adopted and adapted the best practices 
of Western countries to form the most effi-
cient navy in East Asia, which even rivaled 
some Western armadas. 
During the early 17th century, the Toku-
gawa shogunate banned the construction of 
ocean-going vessels and limited Japan's 
interaction with Western countries. By the 
1850s, the growing European presence in 
the East Asian seas convinced the shogunate 
to lift this ban. It called upon the large 
domains-in particular, Satsull.1a, Choshil, 
Kaga, and Tosa-to develop and expand 
their costal defenses and naval technology. 
This was a decentralized effort; the shogun-
ate relied on the Dutch to build a naval train-
ing center in Nagasaki, sent students to 
Holland for further training, and later turned 
to the French for help. French represen-
tatives in Japan were enthusiastic partners 
of the shOgunate, despite wavering support 
back in France. The shogunate, under the 
direction of Oguri Tadamasa and Kurimoto 
Joun, invited the French engineer Francois 
Verny, who had been building a shipyard in 
China, to build facilities in Japan. Verny 
chose Yokosuka as the location to build an 
iron foundry, arsenal, and dry dock; con-
struction began in 1865. The French also 
opened a school in Yokosuka to train future 
Japanese navy men, which included classes 
in mathematics and French language. Sat-
suma, in contrast, purchased ships and arms 
from the British. 
By the Meiji Restoration (1868), the 
domains mentioned previously possessed 
between 5 and 12 steamships. Most of the 
ships were obsolete by Western standards, 
having few armaments and little power, 
and, in many cases, represented nothing 
more than glorified transport barges. One 
American observer noted that Japan became 
the market for Western countries looking to 
sell their outdated ships. Naval considera-
tions played little role in the fighting during 
the Restoration. One of the shogunate's top 
naval men, Katsu Kaishu, who negotiated 
the capitulation of the Tokugawa forces, 
turned over some of the Tokugawa ships to 
the Satcha-Ied forces, while the rest were 
commandeered by the Enomoto Takeaki. 
Enomoto took the shogunate's remaining 
fleet north to Hakodate, where he led a final 
battle against SatcM troops. He eventually 
surrendered, and returned the ships. 
During the early Meiji period (1868-
1912), concerns about a naval conflict with 
Western countries gave way to a focus on 
bolstering the Japanese army against inva-
sion and possible domestic uprisings. Poli-
tics also favored the army's development 
over the navy-many early naval officials 
were former shogunate officials, including 
those few who had any naval experience, 
such as Katsu Kaishu and Enomoto. Both 
men became navy ministers, but even they 
lacked significant knowledge of the sea. 
Still, the dearth of equipment and any 
significant naval tradition meant that the 
Meiji state could draw from a broad range 
of Western naval philosophies and new 
technologies. In 1870, the state officially 
adopted the British navy as its model, send-
ing students to Great Britain for training, 
funding a British mission to Japan, and 
translating British naval texts. The British 
also helped the Japanese create a naval war 
college, and acquired the first ships specifi-
cally built for the Japanese market, which 
used the most recent technology. 
The navy's importance grew during the 
1880s. It received a larger share of the 
military budget and attracted greater atten-
tion from the Meiji oligarchs, especially 
after SatcM men began to domifiate the top 
navy positions. Several statesman, such as 
Iwakura Tomomi, argued that a country's 
standing in the world was displayed by its 
navy's prowess-a position that represented 
a shift from older naval concerns over 
defense of the homeland to Japan as an 
imperial player. New French naval develop-
ments continued to influence the Japanese 
navy, especially a controversial organiza-
tional philosophy called the "Jeune Ecole." 
Rather than the relying on bulky fleet 
consisting of large warships, like the British 
model, this French school of thought emp-
hasized small to medium-sized ships armed 
with light, fast-firing guns, especially tor-
pedo ships. This model provided a solution 
to Japan's financial weaknesses; it could 
not afford a complete British-style fleet. 
Even so, Japan never completely abandoned 
its relationship with the British navy; in 
1892, it purchased the Yoshino, the fastest 
cruiser in the world at the time. 
Administratively, the Japanese navy 
finally became independent during the 
1880s. Under the old British model, the top 
navy minister was beholden to a civilian 
bureaucracy; in contrast, the army followed 
the Prussian model and staffed its bureauc-
racy with royalty and others with direct 
links to the monarch. The state changed 
this model, creating a nayy ministry that 
maintained equal footing with the army. 
This exacerbated competition between the 
army and navy for the public's attention 
and budget appropriations. One political 
strategy on the navy's part was to encourage 
a shared vision among ·citizens, business-
men, and politicians, to expand into the 
South Pacific (called "Nan'yo") which 
could become a place for migration, pos-
sible colonization, and adventure. The 
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navy's attention southward rivaled the 
army's push toward the Asian continent, a 
source of tension that would never be 
resolved. 
On the eve of Japan's first modern wars 
against China and Russia, the navy shifted 
from a haphazard mix of obsolete Western 
ships to one capable of defeating a navy as 
large as Russia's. Japan's initial naval weak-
nesses did not, however, put it too far behind 
the West; even during the 19th century, there 
was no consensus about how a navy should 
operate or how it should be equipped. 
Japan's naval modernization reflected the 
shifting trends in the West, allowing it to 
catch up quickly. 
Michael Wert 
See also: Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and 
Sailors; Iwakura Tomomi; Katsu Kaishu; 
Russo-Japanese War; World War L 
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New Guinea Campaign (March 8, 
1942-September 13, 1945) 
On January 23, 1942, Japanese forces under 
Major General Horii Tomitaro invaded New 
Britain, New Guinea, capturing Rabaul 
from its Australian garrison, known as Lark 
Force. Moving into mainland New Guinea 
on March 8, Japanese forces then occupied 
